



OESTERREICHISCHE NATIONALBANK  
EUROSYSTEM

# **The sensitivity of CESEE banks' net interest margins to market interest rates**

13th South-Eastern European Economic Research Workshop  
Tirana, 5 December 2019

Katharina Allinger and Julia Wörz / Foreign Research Division  
[www.oenb.at](http://www.oenb.at)



## Motivation

- Since the Global Financial Crisis many research papers focused on the nexus between low interest rates and bank profitability, in particular banks' net interest margins (NIM)
- Important topic as **bank profitability key for financial stability**
- Studies tend to find that **as interest rates decline, so does the NIM and the effect becomes stronger at lower rates**
- **No econometric studies on CESEE to our knowledge**; existing studies focused mostly on advanced economies and/ or large, international banks
- **Our research questions:**
  - Is the relationship between NIMs and market rates also concave for the CESEE banks?
  - Does it differ by (selected) country and bank characteristics?

## Data

- Bank level data stems from S&P Global Market Intelligence, macro data from Bloomberg, Macrobond and national central banks
- Study includes **15 CESEE countries** (8 CESEE-EU: BG, CZ, HR, HU, PL, RO, SI, SK + 5 Western Balkan: AL, BA, ME, MK, RS + RU + TR)
- Time period from **2006 to 2018** (few observations for the period 2006-2010)
- Statistically significant **fall of net interest margins over time**

## Summary statistics NIMs over all banks by year

	mean	median	sd	n
2006	5.1	4.7	4.2	65
2007	4.7	4.5	2.8	78
2008	4.6	4.3	2.3	100
2009	4.4	3.9	1.9	104
2010	4.1	3.8	1.7	108
2011	4.7	4.1	3.3	489
2012	4.6	4.0	3.2	505
2013	4.5	3.9	3.3	514
2014	4.5	3.9	2.9	517
2015	4.3	3.6	3.3	516
2016	4.4	3.7	3.0	512
2017	4.3	3.6	3.2	522
2018	4.0	3.4	2.9	467
Total	4.4	3.8	3.1	4,497

Source: author's calculations.

## Model

Model closely related to a study by Borio et al. (2015)<sup>1</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} nim_{i,k,t} = & \alpha_1 nim_{i,k,t-1} + \alpha_2 nim_{i,k,t-2} + \beta_1 r_{k,t} + \beta_2 r_{k,t}^2 + \gamma_1 \sigma_{k,t} + \varphi' C_{k,t} \\ & + \omega' X_{i,k,t} + time\ dummies + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{i,k,t} \end{aligned}$$

$nim_{i,k,t}$	net interest margins as reported
$r_{k,t}$	weighted interest rate indicator (national, Euro Area, U.S. and Swiss 3-month market rates weighted with currency split of banking sector loans)
$\sigma_{k,t}$	coefficient of variation of domestic interest rates
$C_{k,t}$	macro controls
$X_{i,k,t}$	bank level controls
$\mu_i$	bank fixed effect

<sup>1</sup> Borio, C., L. Gambacorta and B. Hofmann. 2015. The influence of monetary policy on bank profitability. In: BIS Working Papers 514.

## Results of difference GMM estimations

- For CESEE banks the **relationship between NIMs and interest rates is concave**
- The effect is
  - somewhat stronger for banks in EU-countries** compared to banks in non-EU countries
  - somewhat stronger for banks located in countries with inflation targeting regimes** versus those with other exchange rate regimes
  - roughly the same for banks below and above the median bank size** in the respective country
  - only significant for banks with more traditional business models** (measured by share of loans in total assets and share of net interest income in total operating income)

**Table 2. Results - regression output**

	(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Baseline	EU dummy <sup>2</sup>	Exchange rate regime <sup>2</sup>	Size dummy <sup>2</sup>	Loan share <sup>2</sup>	Deposit share <sup>2</sup>	Interest income share <sup>2</sup>
Dummy interactions with r	no	default = non-EU	default = non-inflation-targeting	default = below country median	default = below sample median		
Lnim	0.65***	0.66***	0.67***	0.65***	0.64***	0.61**	0.53*
L2.nim	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
r (default)	0.19***	0.21***	0.16**	0.18**	0.10	0.17***	0.09
r (alternative)		0.25***	0.20***	0.20***	0.28***	0.21***	0.20***
r <sup>2</sup> (default)	-0.01**	-0.01**	-0.01*	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01*	-0.01
r <sup>2</sup> (alternative)		-0.02*	-0.01	-0.01**	-0.02***	-0.01**	-0.01
Groups	512	512	512	512	511	512	512
Observations	2699	2699	2699	2694	2698	2697	2696
Hansen p-value	0.39	0.39	0.28	0.41	0.42	0.37	0.41
Autocorrelation 2	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.56	0.36	0.32	0.44

1 Controls and columns (2) and (3) omitted due to space limitations

2 Columns (4) to (9) use interactions of a dummy variable with r and r<sup>2</sup>, where the dummy values are reported as

Notes: \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01, estimated with Arellano-Bond two-step estimator, using forward orthogonal deviations, collapse option and lag restrictions. Windmejer-corrected standard errors.

Source: authors' estimations.

## Robustness and further research

**The results on our main coefficients of interest are robust to a large range of modifications of our sample and model, e.g.**

- Using an alternative measure for NIMs from the ECB
- Excluding from the sample (1) individual countries, (2) the smallest banks, (3) pre-2011 observations
- Adding additional control variables and the term spread
- Using a specification as close as possible to Borio et al. (2015)

## Caveats and further research

- Market interest rate indicator modification
- Estimating the effects on other profitability components and overall profitability
- Trying different estimation methods (e.g. Panel VAR)

## Conclusions

- Ours is – to our knowledge – the only study which uses econometric techniques **to estimate the effect of the (low) interest rate environment on banks' NIMs in CESEE.**
- Similar to the existing literature on other regions we find **that NIMs fall as interest rates fall and the effect is larger the lower interest rates**; e.g. if our weighted interest indicator falls from 5% to 4% NIMs decrease by roughly 10 basis points, while for a drop from 2% to 1% the effect is 15 basis points.
- As Net Interest Income makes up roughly 70% of banks' operating income in CESEE, **pressure from falling interest rates should be monitored closely.** This applies **in particular for banks, which are more vulnerable**, e.g. banks with a very traditional business model.
- In so far as banks engage in actions to mitigate falling NIMs with adverse behaviour, e.g. increased risk taking, these actions should also be monitored closely.

**Danke für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit**

**Thank you for your attention**

[www.oenb.at](http://www.oenb.at)

[oenb.info@oenb.at](mailto:oenb.info@oenb.at)

 [@oenb](https://twitter.com/oenb)

 [@nationalbank\\_oesterreich](https://www.instagram.com/nationalbank_oesterreich)

 [OeNB](https://www.youtube.com/OeNB)





## Annex I – Robustness checks

**Table 2. Robustness checks - regression output**

	(1)	(3)	(4)	(2)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Baseline	Term spread plus r	Term spread plus r (EU countries only)	Alternative variable <sup>1</sup> instead of NIM	Excluding small banks <sup>2</sup>	Excluding Russia <sup>3</sup>	EU only <sup>3</sup>	Only post- 2010 observations
Lnim	0.65 ***	0.69 ***	0.60 ***		0.64 ***	0.59 ***	0.58 ***	0.61 **
L2.nim	-0.05	-0.04			-0.02	-0.09 **		-0.07
L3.nim						0.06		
Lspread				0.73 ***				
r	0.19 ***	0.19 **	0.19 *	0.16 ***	0.15 ***	0.16 **	0.18 **	0.25 ***
r <sup>2</sup>	-0.01 **	-0.01 **	0.01	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01 ***
term spread		-0.07	0.27 *					
term spread <sup>2</sup>		0.03	-0.05					
Groups	512	426	162	523	288	270	162	512
Observations	2699	2248	1101	3211	1688	1338	1101	2471
hansenp	0.39	0.42	0.26	0.73	0.46	0.31	0.23	0.32
ar2p	0.35	0.33	0.72	0.31	0.04	0.71	0.77	0.48

<sup>1</sup> The spread variable is calculated according to an ECB methodology. For details see Ebner et al. (2016).

<sup>2</sup> National market share smaller than 0.3%

<sup>3</sup> Lags of dependent variable and instrument options modified

Notes: \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , estimated with Arellano-Bond two-step estimator, using forward orthogonal deviations, collapse option and lag restrictions. Windmeijer-corrected standard errors.

Source: authors' estimations.

## Annex II – Choice of specification

**Table 2A. Choice of estimation method - regression output**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	POLS	Fixed Effects	Arellano Bond (fod <sup>1</sup> )	Arellano Bond (fd <sup>1</sup> )	Blundell-Bond (fod <sup>1</sup> )	Blundell-Bond (fd <sup>1</sup> )
Lnim	0.77 ***	0.42 ***	0.65 ***	0.64 ***	0.61 ***	0.56 ***
L2.nim	0.07	-0.07	-0.05	-0.08 *	-0.08	-0.10 *
r	0.09 **	0.17 ***	0.19 ***	0.38 ***	0.22 ***	0.29 ***
r <sup>2</sup>	-0.00	-0.01 **	-0.01 **	-0.02 ***	-0.01 **	-0.02 ***
coefficient of variation	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.08 *
ngdp_growth	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00
fin_dev	-0.00	-0.02 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***
size	-0.07 ***	-0.44 ***	-0.40 ***	-0.47 *	-0.16 ***	-0.19 ***
equity_ratio	0.01 **	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.03 ***	0.03 ***
liquidity	-0.01 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.02 *	-0.02 ***	-0.03 ***
cir	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.01 ***
time dummies	included	included	included	included	included	included
_cons	2.70 ***	13.14 ***			6.14 ***	7.20 ***
Groups		526	512	511	526	526
Observations	3225	3225	2699	2667	3225	3225
Hansen p-value			0.39	0.84	0.66	0.73
Autocorrelation 2			0.35	0.64	0.62	0.95

1 fod = forward orthogonal deviations option, fd = first difference option

Notes: \* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01

Source: OeNB. 10